Article 1 of the OHADAC Principles affirms the freedom of contract principle. This is a purely programmatic rule that recognises the private autonomy principle as the basis of contract law.

Freedom of contract is a principle generally recognised in comparative law. In some civil law systems, it is expressly established by acknowledging the freedom of the parties to conclude all contracts, pacts and agreements that they deem appropriate (e.g. Articles 1.547 Honduran Civil Code; 1.839 Mexican Civil Code; 2.437 Nicaraguan Civil Code; 1.106 Panamanian Civil Code; 1.207 of the Puerto Rican Civil Code). The same rule can be found in Article 2 of the Draft Project for Reform of the Law on Obligations prepared by the French Ministry of Justice in 2013 and in international texts harmonising contract law [Articles 1.1 (UP); 1:102 (1) (PECL); II-1:102 (DCFR); 1.1 (CESL). Freedom of contract is also the normative and philosophical principle (will theories) of contract law under common law [Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson (1875), LR 19 Eq 462, 465], where a more liberal approach comprises the fundamental respect for contractual freedom and the minimum of governmental interference with this freedom.

As a programmatic principle, the value of freedom of contract is relative. The wording of this principle in civil law systems is evidence of this relativity. The freedom of contract of parties is restricted by the obligation to follow the law, good morals, public policy and even usage. This limitation is shared by common law systems. Therefore, a common principle comprises the possibility of restricting freedom of contract on the fundamental grounds of the public interests at stake. These restrictions affect the legality of the contract and its object, restrictions of its object in some commercial branches reserved for State monopoly, the existence of public policy statutes on trade protection and free competition, the protection of some parties to the contract or the requirement of certain standards of commercial morality. The mandatory nature or impossibility of derogation of certain rules guarantees freedom of contract as a public interest, insofar as free will is not allowed on rules on valid consent and its voiding reasons.

As mentioned above in the comment to paragraph III of the Preamble, the OHADAC Principles are subject to public policy statutes of national, international and supranational origin that may be legitimately applied on the ground of their geographic proximity and their international public policy scope. The impossibility of derogation of some mandatory rules of the Principles has also been noted.

Finally, it must be observed that the OHADAC Principles are applicable only when the parties have so agreed. Therefore, in cases brought before national courts, the application of the OHADAC Principles will derive from the parties' agreement, the enforceability of which is directly based on the will of the parties. This means that the incorporation by the parties of the OHADAC Principles as an agreement based on the freedom of contract is subject to the limitations imposed on this freedom by the national law applicable to the contract, which will fix the mandatory framework and permit the derogation by the parties. Hence the important point mentioned above that the parties must add the applicable national law of their choice when they adopt the OHADAC Principles.

In arbitral procedures, the OHADAC Principles can work as applicable law on the merits with no submission to any national law. However, as in cases before national courts, the provision included in paragraph V of the Preamble will be applied in any event, since, regardless of the law applicable to the merits, courts as well as arbitrators may take into account public policy statutes from other legal systems closely linked to the contract, in particular the law of the forum and the law of the place of performance of the contract.